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Abstract
We show that once interfamily exchanges are considered, Beckers rotten kids mechan-
ism has some remarkable implications that have gone hitherto unnoticed. Specically,
we establish that Cornes and Silvas (1999) result of e¢ ciency in the contribution game
amongst siblings extends to a setting where the contributors (spouses) belong to dif-
ferent families. More strikingly still, the mechanism does not just have consequences
for e¢ ciency but it may have dramatic redistributive implications. In particular, we
show that the rotten kids mechanism combined with a contribution game to a house-
hold public good may lead to an astonishing equalization of consumptions between the
spouses and their parents, even when their parentswealth levels di¤er. We consider two
families, each consisting of a parent and an adult child, who are linkedby the young
spouses. Children contribute part of their time to a household (couple) public good
and provide attention to their respective parents in exchangefor a bequest. Spouses
behave towards their respective parents like Beckers rotten kids; they are purely selsh
and anticipate that their altruistic parents will leave them a bequest. The most striking
results obtain when wages are equal and when parentsinitial wealth levels are not too
di¤erent. For very large wealth di¤erences the mechanism must be supplemented by a
(mandatory) transfer that brings them back into the relevant range. When wages di¤er
but are similar the outcome will be near e¢ cient (and near egalitarian).
Keywords: rotten kids, altruism, private provision of public good, subgame perfect
equilibrium, family aid,
JEL-Classication: D13, D61, D64
1 Introduction
Beckers (1974; 1991) rotten kids theoremhas by now become one of he cornerstones
of family economics. In his seminal paper Becker presents the challenging idea that
intergenerational exchanges within a family may be e¢ cient even when the children are
purely selsh and the altruistic parents lack the power to commit to a reward scheme
that might provide the children with the proper incentives to behave according to the
common good. The extensive subsequent literature has both qualied and extended
this result.1
The probably most prominent qualication is due to Bergstrom (1989) who shows
that the result rests on a certain number of restrictive assumptions (single good, interior
solution, etc.). However, none of these seriously undermines Beckers basic insight.
While the outcome may not be e¢ cient under realistic assumptions, the fundamental
mechanism continues to be at work and spontaneously yields some cooperativebeha-
vior in a world which is otherwise biased towards totally selsh conduct.2
Amongst the various extensions, one of the most remarkable ones is Cornes and
Silva (1999) who show that the rotten kids theorem holds in a world with a private and
a public good. The siblings non-cooperatively contribute to the family public good.
By transferring the private good after the children have chosen their contributions to
the public good, the benevolent parent achieves fulllment of the Samuelson condition.
In other words, the rotten kid mechanism may even be an e¤ective way to achieve
e¢ cient contributions to (household) public goods in a non-cooperative world (where
Nash equilibria are otherwise typically not e¢ cient).3
So far this literature has essentially concentrated on the exchanges within a single
family.4 We show that once interfamily exchanges are considered the rotten kids mech-
1See Laferrère and Wol¤ (2006) for an overview.
2For instance, in a recent paper Cremer and Roeder (2013) show that when there are several goods,
including family aid (and long-term care services in general) the outcome is likely to be ine¢ cient. Still,
the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of aid is provided as long as the
bequest motive is operative.
3E¢ ciency is, however, only guaranteed if the solution to the kids problem is interior, that is, if all
children make contributions to the family public good. Chiappori and Werning (2002) provide examples
when this is or is not the case.
4A notable exception is Cornes, Itaya and Tanaka (2012) who consider two families and di¤erent
scenarios of contributors to a (general) public good. They focus on Warrs (1982) neutrality result and
show that it continues to hold in their setting. This result says that lump-sum redistributions between
participants in a Nash game of private provision of a public good are allocatively neutral when all
participants make positive contributions and have the same productivity in producing the public good.
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anism has some remarkable implication that have gone hitherto unnoticed. Specically,
we establish that Cornes and Silvas result of e¢ ciency in the contribution game amongst
siblings extends to a setting where the contributors (spouses) belong to di¤erent famil-
ies. More strikingly still, the mechanism does not just have consequences for e¢ ciency
but it may have dramatic redistributive implications. In particular, we show that the
rotten kids mechanism combined with a contribution game to a household public good
may lead to an astonishing equalization of consumptions between the spouses and their
parents, even when their parents original wealth levels are quite di¤erent.
We consider a setting with two families each consisting of a retired parent and an
adult child who are linkedby the young spouses. Children contribute part of their
time to a household (couple) public good like child care or other domestic duties. Ad-
ditionally, they provide attention (or caregiving services) to their respective parents in
exchangefor a bequest. Spouses behave towards their respective parents like Beckers
rotten kids; they are purely selsh and anticipate that their altruistic parents will leave
them a bequest. Parents cannot commit to a rule linking this bequest to the amount
of attention provided by the child. In other words, a threat to, say, disinherit (other
otherwise punish) the child who does not provide some specied level of attention is not
credible, because children anticipate that the estate and its allocation will be determined
by the altruistic parent.
We start by determining the set of Pareto-e¢ cient allocations which are used as a
benchmark. Not surprisingly, the levels of aid are set to equalize marginal cost (the
childs wage) to the marginal benets incurred by the parent. The optimal provision
of the family public good satises the Samuelson rule. When children di¤er in wages,
Pareto-e¢ ciency requires that only the lower-wage spouse contributes to the household
public good. When children have equal wages, only the total provision of the house-
hold public good is uniquely dened and any allocation of this total level between the
individual spouses is equally e¢ cient.
We then study the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium that occurs when parents
and children play a two-stage game, the timing of which reects the rotten kids ap-
proach. First, the children (spouses) choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively the
time spend with their parents, and their contribution to the family public good. Second,
the parents set (simultaneously and non-cooperatively) the bequest left to their respect-
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ive child.
This equilibrium turns out to have a number of interesting properties some of which
are rather surprising. Levels of family aid are always e¢ cient; this is perfectly in line with
the rotten kids specication and not surprising. The most stunning results arise when
wages are equal. Unless parents wealth levels are very di¤erent we then obtain a (unique)
interior equilibrium where both spouses contribute to the public good. This equilibrium
is e¢ cient (the Samuelson condition is satised), which is otherwise typically not the case
in non-cooperative contribution games; see Bergstrom et al. (1986). More surprisingly
still, it always corresponds to the utilitarian (equal individual weights) Pareto-e¢ cient
allocation. Consequently, consumption levels are equalized within and across families,
in spite of the fact that the spouses have parents with di¤erent wealth levels. Both
properties arise because a rotten kid like mechanism is at work under which spouses
contributions are e¤ectively subsidized through adjustments in the bequests. This is
reminiscent of the results obtained by Cornes and Silva (1999) within a single family
setting. The striking feature of our results is that this property extends to a setting
where the contributors have di¤erent parents (they are spouses rather than siblings).
In addition, the rotten kids mechanism proofs not only to promote e¢ ciency but also
to spontaneously achieve a perfect redistribution not only between the spouses but
also between their respective parents. In other words, the initial wealth di¤erences are
spontaneously washed out by the interplay of contributions, aid and bequests.
These results occur when the contribution equilibrium is interior, which in turn is
the case when the di¤erence in parents wealth does not exceed a certain threshold.
The level of this threshold increases with the signicance of the expenditure on the
household public good; when these expenditures are su¢ ciently large, the contribution
can neutralize initial wealth di¤erence.
When wealth di¤erences are large, there will be a (unique) corner equilibrium where
only the spouse with the richest parents contributes. This equilibrium is no longer ef-
cient and consumption levels are not equalized between parents. We also show that
in this case some ex ante redistribution (at stage 0) between families can restore ef-
ciency. Interestingly, to accomplish this it is not necessary to fully equalize wealth
levels. The redistribution must just bring them within the range that yields an interior
equilibrium. The contribution game then takes care of the rest, achieving e¢ ciency and
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perfect equalization of consumption levels. We return to the case where the equilibrium
corresponds to the utilitarian allocation.
The results are more complex in the case where the spouses di¤er in wage. While
Pareto-e¢ ciency requires that only the lower wage spouse contributes to the public
good the equilibrium can yield any pattern of contributions. Depending on the wealth
and wage heterogeneity we can have an interior or a corner solution, with either of the
spouses (even the high wage one) as sole contributor. This equilibrium is (almost) never
e¢ cient, even when the solution is of the right type. However, when spouseswages are
not exactly equal but su¢ ciently similar the solution will be interior and close to the
utilitarian allocation.5 In any event, whatever the wage di¤erential e¢ ciency can, once
again be reestablished with a transfer in stage 0, but unlike in the previous case, there
is no longer a whole range of possible transfers but only a single level which does the
job.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 determines the
Pareto-e¢ cient allocations while Section 4 analyzes the laissez-faire solution. Section 5
shows how the Pareto-e¢ cient solution can be implemented whenever the laissez-faire
is not Pareto-e¢ cient. Section 6 concludes and an appendix contains most of the proofs.
2 The model
We consider two families i = 1; 2 each consisting of one parent (superscript p) and one
child (superscript c). Parents are altruistic while children are purely selsh. The young
constitute a couple who non-cooperatively produces a household public good, G, like
housework. The production of this household public good is linear and costs gi 2 [0;  ]
units of time. The total amount of time available is  . Children may also spend some
time ai 2 [0;  ] with their (own) parents providing them simply with attention or with
aid in case of illness or dependency. The (monetary) value of this time for their parents
is given by h(ai) with h0 > 0; h00 < 0. The residual time    gi   ai is spend on the
labor market for which the child receives the wage rate wi. Parents own a wealth of
xi, and may leave a bequest bi  0 to their child. Wages of the children as well as
wealth of the parents may di¤er between families implying w1 Q w2 and x1  x2. Both
5Provided that parents wealth di¤erences are not too large.
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generations derive utility from consumption of a numeraire commodity, while the young
couple additionally enjoys consumption of the household public good. The altruistic
parent maximizes the welfare function W pi = U
p
i + U
c
i . The parents ownutility (not
including the altruistic element) is given by
Upi = u(xi + h(ai)  bi) 8 i;
while the utility of the child is represented by
U ci = u(wi(   gi   ai) + bi) + '(G) 8 i:
The utility functions satisfy u0; '0 > 0 and u00; '00 < 0 and we have G = g1 + g2.
Both families are perfectly informed about each others characteristics, which allows
us to focus on the e¢ ciency and distributional issues. The timing of the game is as
follows: rst, the children (spouses) choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively the
time spend with their parents, ai, and their contribution to the family public good, gi.
Second, the parents set (simultaneously and non-cooperatively) the bequest, bi, left to
their respective child. To determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium we solve this
game by backward induction. Before we turn our attention to the laissez-faire solution,
we will study the Pareto-e¢ cient allocations which provide a benchmark against which
we can compare the Nash equilibrium outcome.
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3 Pareto-e¢ cient allocations
Denoting consumption levels of the parents by mi and of the children by di, Pareto-
e¢ cient allocations solve the following maximization problem6
max
m1;m2;d1;d2;a1;a2;g1;g2
W =
2X
i=1
n
pi u(mi) + 
c
i

u(di) + '(G)
o
s.t.
2X
i=1

wi(   gi   ai) + xi + h(ai)
	  2X
i=1

mi + di
	
G =
2X
i=1
gi; and ai + gi   8 i: (1)
where ci ; 
p
i 2 (0; 1) denote the weights attached to the childs and parents utility of
family i = 1; 2. They are normalized to sum up to one:
2X
i=1

ci + 
p
i
	
= 1:
Solving this problem for a given vector of weights yields a specic Pareto-e¢ cient al-
location and the full set of e¢ cient allocations can be described by varying the weights.
Denoting L the Lagrangian expression associated with problem (1), the rst-order con-
ditions (FOCs) are given by
@L
@mi
=pi u
0(mi)   = 0 8 i; (2)
@L
@di
=ciu
0(di)   = 0 8 i; (3)
@L
@ai
=ci (h
0(ai)  wi) = 0 ) h0(ai) = wi 8 i; (4)
@L
@gi
=  wi + (c1 + c2)'0(G)  0 8 i; (5)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the resource constraint. Equations
(2) and (3) state that the (weighted) marginal utilities between and across families
should be equalized. Equation (4) shows that attention should be chosen such that its
marginal benet to the parent is equal to the marginal costs of its provision. It shows
that the level of ai is the same in all Pareto-e¢ cient allocations (it does not depend on
6Throughout the paper, we assume that the time constraint ai + gi   will be never binding.
6
the weights). Equation (5) determines the Pareto-e¢ cient public good contributions for
both spouses; it can be easily veried that g1 > 0 and g2 = 0 if w1 < w2. In words, it
is e¢ cient that only the spouse with the lower wage rate (production costs) contributes
to the family public good. Conditions (2), (3) and (5) can be simplied to
minfw1; w2g = '
0(G)
u0(d1)
+
'0(G)
u0(d2)
(6)
which is the Samuelson rule, stating that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution
between the public and the private good must be equal to the marginal costs of produc-
tion. When children have equal wages (w1 = w2), G is uniquely dened (for a given set
of weights) by (6) along with the FOCs (2)(4), but individual contributions can take
any values satisfying g1 + g2 = G.7
We denote the utilitarian solution that arises with equal weights (c1 = 
c
2 = 
p
1 =
p2 = 1=4) with the superscript
e. It is given by
u0(me1) = u
0(de1) = u
0(me2) = u
0(de2); (7)
h0(aei ) = wi 8 i; (8)
minfw1; w2g = 2'
0(Ge)
u0(de1)
: (9)
Note that the level of Ge is unique for a given total level of wealth in society (x1 + x2).
When either xi or wi changes so does the optimal Ge.8 Observe that while ge1 and g
e
2
are not uniquely dened when wages are equal, they are well dened when wages di¤er.
Specically when wi < wj (i; j = 1; 2) we have gei = G
e and gej = 0.
The following sections show that an equilibrium of the two-stage game will satisfy
conditions (7)(9) when children have the same wage rate, w1 = w2, while parents
wealth levels may di¤er but within a limited range. In other words, in these cases the
7The level of G will (in general) vary accross Pareto-e¢ cient allocations.
8For equal wages (w1 = w2) Ge is determined by
 wiu0

x1 + x2 + 2wi(   aei ) + 2h(aei )  wiGe
4

+ 2'0(Ge) = 0:
Di¤erentiating yields
dGe
dxi
=
wi
4
u00(dei )
w2i
4
u00(dei ) + 2'00(Ge)
=
1
wi +
8'00(Ge)
wiu00(dei )
> 0:
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laissez-faire equilibrium corresponds to the utilitarian optimum. On the other hand,
when children di¤er in wages the contribution equilibrium is in general ine¢ cient. How-
ever, e¢ ciency of the laissez-faire solution and its coincidence with the utilitarian alloc-
ation can be reestablished through an appropriate lump-sum transfer between parents.
4 Laissez-faire solution
As usual in two-stage games, we begin by analyzing the second stage. The parent solves
the following optimization problem
max
bi
Upi = u(xi + h(ai)  bi) + u(wi(   gi   ai) + bi) + '(G) s.t. bi  0 8 i:
The FOC with respect to bequests is given by
@Upi
@bi
=  u0(mi) + u0(di)  0 8 i: (10)
That is, bequests in both families are chosen so that consumption levels between the
parent and the child are equalized. We assume throughout the paper that the bequest
motive is operative so that bi is given by an interior solution and (10) holds as equality.
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Denote bi  bi(gi; ai) the optimal bequest level. Di¤erentiating this expression shows
that the derivatives of bequests with respect to public good investments and attention
are as follows
@bi
@gi
=
u00(di)wi
u00(mi) + u00(di)
=
wi
2
> 0 8 i; (11)
@bi
@ai
=
u00(mi)h0(ai) + u00(di)wi
u00(mi) + u00(di)
=
h0(ai) + wi
2
> 0 8 i: (12)
When the child increases his contributions to the family public good, the parent com-
pensates the child by half of his forgone wage income, wi. Additionally, when the child
increases his attention to the parent, the bequest increases by half of the parents return,
9Recall that bequests are restricted to be nonnegative, and one obtains from (10)
bi > 0 () xi + h(ai) > wi(   ai   gi) 8 i:
In words, the net resources of the parents (including the monetary value of informal aid, if any) must
be larger than that of the children otherwise the bequest motive is not operative.
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h0(ai), plus by half of the childs forgone wage income, wi.
At stage 1, child is problem is
max
ai;gi
U ci = u(wi(   ai   gi) + bi ) + '(G) s.t. gi  0 8 i:
A non-negativity constraint is imposed on gi because a corner solution is possible. When
choosing the attention to the parent and investments in the (own) family public good,
the child takes into consideration the adjustments in bequests and takes the spouses
contributions g-i as given
@U ci
@ai
=u0(di)

 wi + @b

i
@ai

= 0 8 i; (13)
@U ci
@gi
=u0(di)

 wi + @b

i
@gi

+ '0(G)  0 8 i: (14)
With equations (11) and (12), the above rst-order conditions can be written as
 wi + h
0(ai) + wi
2
=0 ) h0(ai ) = wi 8 i; (15)
 u0(di)wi
2
+ '0(G) 0 ) 2'0(G)  u0(di)wi 8 i: (16)
Equation (15) directly determines ai ; the spouses level of attention a

-i is of no relevance
and there is e¤ectively no strategic interaction on this variable. Substituting this level of
attention into equation (16) and taking into account the constraint gi  0, we can solve
for the spousesbest response functions for the contributions to the family public goodeg1(g2) and eg2(g1). The Nash equilibrium levels of contributions (g1; g2) are dened in the
usual way by the mutual best reply conditions g1 = eg1(g2) and g2 = eg2(g1). Existence
of this equilibrium is easily established.10 The total equilibrium amount of the family
public good produced by the couple is then given by G = g1 + g2.
Two distinct types of equilibria are possible; an interior solution, that is, one in
which both spouses contribute to the household public good and a corner solution in
which only one of the spouses contributes. For future reference note that with (10) an
10Strategy spaces are compact sets and each players utility is continuous and quasi-concave in his
own strategic variable.
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interior Nash equilibrium satises
u0(d1)w1 =2'
0(G) , u0

(   a1   g1)w1 + h(a1) + x1
2

w1 = 2'
0(G); (17)
u0(d2)w2 =2'
0(G) , u0

(   a2   g2)w2 + h(a2) + x2
2

w2 = 2'
0(G): (18)
We shall now examine the properties of the Nash equilibrium and analyze the e¢ ciency
of the induced allocation. We start with the case where children have identical wages
and then consider the case where wages di¤er.
4.1 Identical children
Assume children are equally productive in the labor market, w1 = w2  w. Recall that
subscript 2 is used for families with higher wealth (x1  x2). To simplify notation, we
x x2 at some arbitrary level and then study the Nash equilibrium and its properties as
a function of x1. Observe that as long as eg1 is an interior solution for which (16) holds
as equality, we have
@eg1
@x1
=
u00(d1)w
u00(d1)
w21
2 + 2'
00(G)
> 0: (19)
Thus, for a given level of x2, the best response of spouse 1 to any level of g2 decreases
as x1 becomes smaller. Consequently, we expect that the equilibrium moves from the
interior one to the corner solution when spouse 1s wealth falls. This conjecture is
conrmed in the following proposition which is established in the Appendix. It shows
that the equilibrium is interior when wealth levels are not too di¤erent, while a corner
solution may arise when x1 is su¢ ciently small.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium is unique and an interior solution (g1 > 0; g2 >
0) if x1 > bx1, while a corner solution (g1 = 0; g2 > 0) arises if x1  bx1, wherebx1  x2   eg2(0)w2.
To get an intuitive understanding of this proposition, consider equation (16) dening
the best responses for w1 = w2. Assume that spouse 2 contributes eg2(0), i.e., her best
response to g1 = 0. Equations (17) and (18) then show that (0; eg2(0)) is an interior
equilibrium if x1 is at exactly the level which yields equal consumption levels (including
the respective bequests) across spouses, d1 = d2 for these respective contributions.
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With equal wages a1 = a2 so that d1 = d2 occurs when x1 = x2   eg2(0)w2. In words,
the wealth di¤erence x2   x1 corresponds to the costs of the spouses contributions:eg2(0)w2   0w1. Taking into account (19) it is plain that for a level of wealth smaller
then bx1 the best (interior) response of spouse 1 to eg2(0) is negative, which along with
the non-negativity constraint brings us to a corner solution. Conversely, when x1 > bx1
the poorer spouse wants to contribute a positive amount as response to eg2(0) and we
get an interior equilibrium.
We now turn to the study of the properties of the equilibrium. It will turn out that
they crucially depend on the type of equilibrium, interior or corner, and thus ultimately
on the wealth di¤erence between the spousesparents; see Proposition 1.
Let us start with the special case where parents have equal wealth x1 = x2  x (in
which case we necessarily have an interior solution). It can be easily veried that the
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game coincides with the Pareto-e¢ ciency
conditions (7)(9) for equal weights; marginal utilities are equalized within and across
families, and time is optimally allocated to the parent and to the production of the family
public good. In other words, the laissez-faire solution corresponds to the utilitarian
optimum. Via an adjustment in bequests, the old not only induce the e¢ cient amount
of attention from their children, but they also achieve that the young couple produces
the e¢ cient amount of their family public good.
The intuition behind this outcome is as follows. The positive bequest equalizes
consumption levels (between parents and children and between spouses) within each
family. Since due to the adjustment in bequests, the child bears only half of the costs
of higher attention but also receives half of its return, he opts for the e¢ cient amount
of ai  ae. This resembles Beckers (1974; 1991) famous rotten kid theorem. However,
in our setting also public good investments within the young generation are e¢ cient.
Again via the adjustment in bequests the child e¤ectively bears only half of the costs
of higher public good investments. Since each child equalizes his own marginal costs
of investments with his own marginal benets, the tradeo¤ by equation (16) becomes
e¤ectively the e¢ cient one. Recall that from (17)(18) we have u0(d1) = u0(d2). Con-
sequently, both spouses have the same marginal benet of the public good.11 In other
words, public good investments by each spouse are chosen such that the Samuelson rule,
11So that the social benet is exactly twice the individual benet.
11
equation (6), is satised implying G = Ge.
To see this, note that for equal wages equations (17) and (18) imply
d1 = d

2 , (   g1)w + x1 = (   g2)w + x2: (20)
With x1 = x2 and G = g1 + g2 we have g1 = g2 = G=2. That is, both spouses equally
contribute to the family public good.
Interestingly, this result also holds when parents di¤er in their wealth levels, x1 < x2,
as long as the di¤erence is not too large so that the solution continues to be interior
for both g1 and g2. In this case, the spouse who expects the higher bequest (spouse
2) contributes more to the family public good than the one with the lower bequest.
More precisely, the contributions to the family public good by spouse 2 are chosen so
that consumption levels between the couple are equalized and the laissez-faire allocation
again coincides with the (utilitarian) Pareto-e¢ cient solution. If, however, the di¤erence
in parents wealth is strong, such that x1  bx1 = x2   weg2(0), the spouse who expects
the lower bequests (spouse 1) contributes nothing to the household public good; we have
a corner solution and condition (6) is no longer satised (because the two spouses no
longer have the same willingness to pay for the public good. The laissez-faire allocation
then not only implies an ine¢ cient level of the family public good, but also unequal
consumption levels within the couple and thus across families. However, even in that
case the rotten kids mechanism continues to be at work and enhances the provision of
the household public good.12 Similarly, since only the spouse with the richest parents
contributes to the family public good (of which half is e¤ectively paid by his parents)
it continues to mitigate wealth di¤erences. The following proposition summarizes our
results.
Proposition 2 The laissez-faire solution (subgame perfect equilibrium) of the two stage
game with two families consisting of altruistic parents and selsh children (the latter
constituting a couple who non-cooperatively produces a household public good) is Pareto-
e¢ cient if the children have the same wage rates, w1 = w2  w, and the parentswealth
is such that x1  bx1  x2 weg2(0) where eg2(0) is the best-response of spouse 2 to g1 = 0.
12This follows because the term @bi =@gi appears in equation (14). In words, the adjustment in
bequests is formally equivalent to a subsidy on contributions which is well known to enhance provision
(recall that individual contributions are strategic substitutes).
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Specically, for an operative bequest motive in both families i = 1; 2
(i) attention provided by the child satises h0(ai) = wi 8i,
(ii) consumption levels between and across families are equalized,
(iii) public good investments by the children satisfy the Samuelson rule, and
(iv) the spouse with the richer parents provides more of the family public good.
For x1 < bx1, the subgame perfect equilibrium is not Pareto-e¢ cient, the time allocation
within families continues to be e¢ cient, but the time devoted to the household public
good is no longer interior but at a corner and the Samuelson rule is not satised.
4.2 Heterogenous children
When children di¤er in wages w1 < w2 the pattern of equilibria that can arise is more
complex. We can have (i) a corner equilibrium with only the lower wage spouse contrib-
uting, (ii) an interior solution with both spouses contributing and even (iii) a corner
equilibrium with only the higher wage spouse contributing. Roughly speaking, one can
expect the interior solution to arise when wage and parentswealth are not too di¤er-
ent. Equilibrium (iii) can be expected if wages are not too di¤erent and the high wage
spouse has much richer parents. In all other cases, equilibrium (i) can be anticipated. A
precise characterization of the parameter values yielding the di¤erent type of equilibria
is tedious and not necessary for the issues we are dealing with. We shall thus restrict
ourselves to presenting an example illustrating that the di¤erent cases can indeed arise.
Example 1 Assume the following functional forms for utility u(d) = 4 ln d, '(G) =
1
2 lnG and h(a) = 4
p
a   2. Additionally assume w1 = 1 < w2 = 2, x2 = 20 and the
total amount of time available is  = 8. With equation (15), we have for the optimal
attention
h0(ai ) = 2(a

i )
 1=2 = wi ) a1 = 4; a2 = 1
implying h(a1) = 6 and h(a2) = 2. With our functional forms for utility equation (16)
amounts to
(   ai   gi )wi + h(ai ) + xi  8wiG:
With the above parameters, we can write the optimal response function for spouse-1 and
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2 as
(8  4  g1) + 6 + x1  8G; (21)
(8  1  g2)2 + 2 + 20  16G: (22)
For x1 = 15 we have a corner equilibrium with only the lower wage spouse contributing:
g1 = 3 and g2 = 0; case (i). For x1 = 6
5
6 both spouses contribute: g

1 =
3
2 and g

2 =
2
3 ;
case (ii). For x1 = 3 we have a corner equilibrium with only the higher wage spouse
contributing: g1 = 0 and g2 = 2; case (iii).
From our perspective, the interesting feature is that equilibria of types (ii) and (iii)
are never e¢ cient: the spouse with the higher time cost contributes at least partly to
the public good production. As to type (i) equilibria, they are in general ine¢ cient.
The equilibrium is e¢ cient (and corresponds to the utilitarian optimum) only when
de1 =
(   ae1   ge1)w1 + h(ae1) + x1
2
= de2 =
(   a2   ge2)w2 + h(ae2) + x2
2
:
Since ge1 and g
e
2 are uniquely dened in the unequal wage case this can occur only
by coincidence; see Subsection 5.2 for further details. Ine¢ ciency arises for exactly
the same reasons as in the corner solution case with identical wages considered in the
previous subsection. Marginal utilities between spouses are no longer equalized; see
equations (17) and (18). Thus, the Samuelson condition is not satised in the Nash
equilibrium and the allocation in the laissez-faire is not Pareto-e¢ cient. Notice however,
that the levels of attention continue to be at their e¢ cient levels (we have ai = a
e
i ).
Finally, the case where wages di¤er but are su¢ ciently close deserves some attention.
Since the best-response functions are continues in wages the equilibrium allocation will
also be a continuous function of both wages.13 Consequently, when w1 is su¢ ciently
close to w2 and when wealth di¤erences are not too large the equilibrium will be
interior and it will be almostor neare¢ cient and utilitarian. To be more precise
as w1 tends to w2 the outcome will tend to the one described in Subsection 4.1. While
this result is rather trivial from a theoretical perspective it is quite important for the
13This requires some additional technical conditions, but since our best-reponse functions are well-
behaved it is plain that the continuity applies in our setting.
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practical implications of our analysis. In reality the case where wages are exactly equal
may be very rare, but under suitable mating patterns wages may often be close enough
so that the notion of near e¢ ciency applies and has relevant implications.
The next section studies those cases where the laissez-faire solution is ine¢ cient and
shows how the e¢ cient solution can be implemented through lump-sum transfers across
families.
5 Implementation of the e¢ cient solution
Assume now that some public authority can put in place policies before the game
between children and parents takes place.
5.1 Corner solution with identical children
We have shown in Subsection 4.1 that with identical children the equilibrium is ine¢ cient
when it corresponds to a corner solution and x1 < bx1. This in turn occurs (for any given
level of x2) when the wealth di¤erence between parents is su¢ ciently signicant. This
problem can be overcome if wealth is redistributed (at stage 0, before the game is played)
to bring wealth di¤erences within the range that yields an interior solution. We then
know from Proposition 3 that this will induce an equilibrium which corresponds to the
utilitarian solution.
The result is formally stated in the following proposition (which is established in the
Appendix).
Proposition 3 Assume that children have equal wages w1 = w2  w, but the parents
wealth di¤erence is such that x1 < bx1, then the utilitarian Pareto-e¢ cient solution can
be implemented by a lump-sum transfer T from high- to low-wealth families, given by
T 2

x2   x1   wGe
2
;
x2   x1 + wGe
2

:
Observe that Ge while being the utilitarian public public good level for the initial
wealth levels x1 and x2 it is of course also the optimal level for the after transfer wealth
levels (only total wealth matters for Pareto-e¢ ciency). The fact that the transfer can
take any value in the above interval resembles Warrs (1983) neutrality result. As long
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as the transfer induces an interior solution, income redistribution is irrelevant in the
presence of a privately provided public good. One can of course set T = (x2   x1)=2 to
make (after transfer) wealth levels equal, but this is not necessary.
5.2 Di¤erent wages
Now we must design a transfer scheme that ensures that the equilibrium is such that
(only) the low wage individual contributes and that spouses(equilibrium) consumption
levels are equal. Recall that this latter condition ensures that both spouses have the
same willingness to pay for the public good, which in turn will ensure that the Samuelson
condition, equation (6), holds. To understand why the sole contributor then provides the
Pareto-e¢ cient level recall that his contribution is subsidized through the extra bequest
so that he only bears half of its cost; see expression (11). And with consumption levels
equalized between spouses his private benets are precisely equal to half of the social
benets. The following proposition, established in the appendix states the required level
of transfer which is equal to half the di¤erence in total incomebetween both families
(evaluated at the optimal solution).
Proposition 4 If parents di¤er in wealth, x1 < x2 and children in wages, w1 7 w2,
the Pareto-e¢ cient allocation with equal weights can be decentralized by a lump-sum
transfer from high- to low-income families. This transfer is simply half the income
di¤erence between both families and given by
T =
x2   x1 + (   ae2   ge2)w2   (   ae1   ge1)w1 + h(ae2)  h(ae1)
2
: (23)
Observe that in this expression one of the gei s (the one associated with the higher
wages spouse) is always equal to zero. Intuitively, with this transfer, we achieve d1 = d2
(which is necessary for the Nash equilibrium to satisfy the Samuelson condition) but for
wj < wi (i; j = 1; 2) also implies wju0(dj ) < wiu
0(di ) which from equation (16) ensures
that only the low wage spouse (type j) will contribute.
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6 Concluding remarks
The main point we have made is, that when applied to an interfamily setting (where fam-
ilies are linkedby young spouses), the rotten kids mechanism may take care of both
e¢ ciency and redistribution (between the spousesrespective families). When spouses
have equal wages it will yield an e¢ cient outcome and wash out parents wealth di¤er-
ences (as long as they are not too large). For larger wealth di¤erences the mechanism
would have to be supplemented by a (mandatory) transfer scheme which brings the
discrepancies back within the relevant range. Interestingly the mechanism continues
to be e¤ective (though less perfect) when spouseswages are not exactly equal but
su¢ ciently similar. The outcome will then be close to the utilitarian allocation. This
remark is crucial when it come to asses the practical implications of our result. In real-
ity it is of course unlikely that spouses have exactly the same wages. Still, assortative
mating is commonly observed and cases where spouses have su¢ ciently similar wages
are not uncommon; see e.g. Schwartz and Mare (2005).
More generally, the mating pattern is crucial for assessing the implications of our
results. In particular, when mating occurs mainly according to the spouseswages then
this may have positive implications both for e¢ ciency and redistribution. It may then
contribute to eliminate wealth di¤erences. However, when the dominant factor is the
parents wealth, mating behavior may be neither good for e¢ ciency nor for redistribu-
tion.
In any event one has to keep in mind that the extent of redistribution achieved
through this channel is limited (to families linkedby marriage). Consequently, while
it can eliminate some wealth di¤erences, it cannot be considered as a substitute for a
well designed redistributive policy (which can be more or less egalitarian according to
the societys preferences). Still, this aspect adds to the various e¢ ciency enhancing
properties of the rotten kids mechanism which have been mentioned in the literature.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume w1 = w2 = w and consider a given level of x2 > 0 (and continue to assume
without loss of generality that x1  x2). From equation (16) we can see that a corner
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solution, (g1 = 0; g2 > 0), prevails if
2'0(G) = 2'0(eg2(0)) < u0(d1)w; (24)
where G = g2 = eg2(0): For x1 = x2, we have
u0(d1)w = u
0

(   a1)w + x1
2

w < u0

(   a2   g2)w + x2
2

w = 2'0(g2);
so that condition (24) does not hold. Since u0(d1) increases as x1 decreases there exists
at most one bx1 dened by bx1 = x2  g2w2 (yielding d1 = d2) with g2 = eg2(0) and g1 = 0
for which (24) holds as equality. When x1 < bx1, there exist then a corner solution (with
only type 2 contributing). And since eg2(g1) is decreasing it is plain that there cannot
also be an interior equilibrium (which would require d1 = d2). When x1 > bx1, condition
(24) is violated and the equilibrium can only be interior. Observe that for x1 = bx1
we have g1 = 0 and g2 > 0 but these levels also satisfy the conditions for an interior
solution (the constraint that g1  0 hold with equality but is not binding). This is
where the transitionbetween corner and interior solution occurs.
To complete the proof it remains to show that an interior equilibrium is unique.
Observe that the slopes the reaction functions are (in absolute values) smaller than one.
Substituting (15) into equation (16) and di¤erentiating yields
dgi
dg-i
=   2'
00(G)
u00(di)wi2 + 2'00(G)
2 ( 1; 0):
This means that the best-reply map is a contraction which immediately implies unique-
ness; see Vives (2001), pages 4748.
Proof of Proposition 3
To determine the optimal transfers, (T1; T2), (the ones that implement the utilitarian
Pareto e¢ cient solution) we have to revisit the di¤erent stages of the game. In stage
2, parents leave a bequest to their children. This bequest is chosen so as to equalize
consumption between the parent and the child,
mi = di =
(   ai   gi)w + h(ai) + xi + Ti
2
8 i:
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Note that as long as bequests are interior, it is irrelevant whether the lump sum transfer
is paid by the children or by the parent.14 With Ti set so that T1 =  T2  T , if follows
from equations (17) and (18) that the best-response functions of spouses 1 and 2 are
implicitly dened by
u0

(   a1   g1)w1 + h(a1) + x1 + T
2

w1 = 2'
0(G); (25)
u0

(   a2   g2)w2 + h(a2) + x2   T
2

w2 = 2'
0(G): (26)
The transfer must be chosen such that an interior solution for both g1 and g2 is guar-
anteed. At an interior solution, we have d1 = d2, implying
(   a1   g1)w1 + h(a1) + x1 + T
2
=
(   a2   g2)w2 + h(a2) + x2   T
2
:
Since w1 = w2  w, we have a1 = a2 and the above equation reduces to
x1 + T   g1w = x2   T   g2w:
At an interior solution, (g1; g2) 2 (0; 1)  (0; 1), the overall public good production,
g1 + g2, is uniquely determined by Ge. That is, we can write
T =
x2   x1 + (2g1  Ge)w
2
:
Since g1 2 (0; Ge) the optimal transfer is in the interval as stated in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
The transfer across families must be chosen such that d1 = d2, then from equations
(17) and (18) it can be seen that only the spouse with the lower wage rate (spouse i)
contributes to the family public good implying gi  Ge and gj = 0 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j).
The transfer T must thus be chosen such that
(   a1   g1)w1 + h(a1) + x1 + T
2
=
(   a2   g2)w2 + h(a2) + x2   T
2
:
14With operative bequests, Ricardian equivalence holds for the transfers.
19
Solving for T yields expression (23) in Proposition 4.
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